Those supplying private regulation in the global economy face two fundamental challenges if they are to ameliorate the problems for which they create these systems: targets must conform to, while demanders must have proof of, regulatory compliance. This paper explores an important area absent from assessments as to whether, when, and how, private regulatory bodies are successful in improving behavior and rewarding compliant firms: the role of technological innovations. Employing an inductive, comparative case study analysis, we offer an analytical framework that distinguishes technological innovations that improve tracking mechanisms from innovations that directly improve on-the-ground performance. We illustrate the utility of the analytical framework through an assessment of technological innovations in shaping "non-state market driven" global certification programs governing forestry, fisheries, coffee, e-waste, and climate.
Introduction
Those supplying private regulation in the global economy face two fundamental challenges if they are to ameliorate the problems for which they create these systems: targets must conform to, while demanders must have proof of, regulatory compliance.
1 Although important scholarly research has improved our understanding of these issues by focusing on the emergence of private regulation, 2 prospects for long-term institutionalization 3 and standards development, 4 we explore an important issue left unattended by this literature: the role of technological innovations in nurturing global private regulation. Technology as a driving force in political, social and economic life has long received scholarly attention. However, we are not aware of any scholarship that applies this lens to the emergence and potential of private regulation. Such an oversight is problematic for two reasons. First, technological innovations can improve the mechanics of private regulation, including supply chain tracking which, we reveal below, provides the demarcation of political communities necessary for these systems to gain authority and legitimacy. Second, technological innovations can improve compliance with the on-the-ground performance requirements of private regulation. Yet just how technology plays a role in shaping these systems and possibly solidifying private authority remains poorly understood.
Our aim is to begin filling this gap by identifying analytical tools for assessing the causal relationships between technology and private authority. We inductively explore the emergence and evolution of "non-state market driven" (NSMD) certification systems in the forest, fisheries, coffee, electronic waste, and climate-mitigation sectors to illustrate the utility of our analytical framework and to identify preliminary findings and patterns with which to orient future research. These global certification systems are the focus because they represent leading efforts to promote compliance through supply chain tracking and because they are, arguably, the furthest away from public authority in comparison to other cases reviewed in this special issue.
Moreover, at the heart of struggles to build NSMD governance rest broader attempts to address the negative consequences of neoliberal globalization, which, it is asserted, frees multinational firms from inconvenient national regulation while discouraging countries seeking foreign investment and trade from enacting and/or enforcing social or environmental standards. 5 Recognition of this objective is important for this paper, as an array of sophisticated literature has 1 Büthe 2010a. 2 Bartley 2007 . 3 Bernstein and Cashore 2007. 4 McDermott, Noah, and Cashore 2006. 5 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Bernstein and Cashore 2004, 279. revealed that technological advances often significantly accelerate the pace and scale of economic globalization's impact on many environmental and social challenges. 6 Technological innovations often make natural resource extraction more efficient, opening new areas to exploitation or allowing extraction rates to exceed biological limits. 7 Intensification of agricultural practices has likewise raised concerns due to possible negative ecological, human health and environmental consequences. 8 Yet these same technological innovations can play a countervailing role in limiting the impact on the environment, human health, etc. Cell phones, for instance, may contribute to the original problem because mining and industrial activities are necessary to produce them, but once produced they can help foster certification tracking or reduce compliance costs in meeting environmental and social regulations. Understanding better cumulative and countervailing effects requires unpacking these distinct causal processes and theorizing about how precisely they matter. Since tracking is such a key part to the success and impact of NSMD certification systems, our focus offers a valuable set of cases with which to understand the role of technology in shaping private authority in general and potentially improving the ability of these initiatives to ameliorate pressing global problems.
This inductive effort uncovers three key insights. First, technologies can shape problem definitions because their successful use focuses attention on issues they are well suited to solve. Second, and as a consequence, such a focus can change and shape coalitions of support for private regulatory institutions. While we review the problematic ways technologies can sometimes narrow policy efforts towards tractable problems, the possibility that this may nurture winning coalitions in favor of broader compliance with environmental and social standards focuses our attention, as we elaborate in the conclusion, towards the evolutionary pathways on which private regulation may be headed. Third, the role of NSMD certification in fostering learning across disparate interests can lead private regulatory institutions to serve as incubators for technologies that may, in turn, improve or transform government regulations. This means, as our climate case reveals, that the interaction of public and private authority is profoundly important, but largely under-theorized.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following parts. Part II reviews key features of global NSMD certification systems that identify their similarities and differences from other forms of private regulation reviewed in this issue and which justifies our empirical focus on them. Part III provides an inductive analytical framework that is sensitive to disentangling complex causal arrows through which technology exacerbates and/or ameliorates environmental and social problems. Part IV applies the framework to probe relevant technologies governing the sectors under review. Part V reflects on the key trends, insights and questions that emerge. We then conclude by theorizing and reflecting more broadly on the implications of our inductive comparison for the reciprocal relationship between public and private arenas as incubators and drivers of technological innovations that can advance efforts to ameliorate global problems.
Private Authority and Non-State Market Driven (NSMD) Global Certification
In the last 15 years a range of "non-state market driven" (NSMD) global certification systems have emerged that share some features with, but are also distinct from, other forms of private regulation examined in this issue. Much of the "supply" of these systems can be traced back to a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), who, frustrated with their limited influence over governmental and intergovernmental processes, began to develop their own sets of socially and environmentally responsible business regulation. They developed systems to reward firms that accepted these standards, often by creating social or environmental "labels." Their idea was that by certifying and tracking responsibly produced goods through complex supply chains 9 they could provide firms-the regulatory targets-economic "carrots" through market recognition for their responsible business practices.
This form of private regulation has been advanced to tackle some of the most important problems associated with resource management 10 have discerned key features that together reveal NSMD systems' similarities and differences from other forms of public and private authority. One feature, shared in varying degrees by broader forms of private authority, 23 is that governments do not require adherence to the NSMD rules. As Cashore takes care to note, governments are involved in many important ways as procurers, financial supporters, and even conveners of standard-setting processes. 24 But what is key is that the sovereign authority that governments possess to develop rules to which society more or less adheres does not apply. No one can be incarcerated or fined for failing to adhere to the rules. This means that supporters of such systems must work to develop alternative sources of authority with which to create obligations and compel support. 25 The existing scholarship that identifies conditions that might enable NSMD systems to achieve "political legitimacy" through normative and/or strategic pathways has thus far failed to examine the important role technology has, as we discuss below, in fostering such support.
A second feature, fundamental to our inquiry below, is that NSMD rules clearly specify particular on-the-ground behaviors that profit-maximizing firms must undertake to address social or environmental externalities of their operations. In other words, NSMD systems pursue prescriptive "hard law", albeit in the private sphere. 26 This focus on regulating externalities distinguishes NSMD systems from other arenas of private authority, such as coordination over essential components of electrical systems and similar technical standards (the original reason for the creation of the International Electrotechnical Commission and then the International Organization for Standardization), in which the rationale for support follows a different logic. 27 Similarly, NSMD systems differ from voluntary environmental management system (EMS) approaches in which firms are certified for developing internal procedures, but which develop no prescriptions about on-the-ground behavior. 28 EMS systems, and particularly ISO 14001, give firms discretion to decide what they want to do to ameliorate environmental or social problems. The United Nations Global Compact is a further example of an initiative that advances general and abstract principles instead of specific behavioral requirements. Although developing management systems can be costly, NSMD systems impose on-the-ground costs by developing prescriptive rules guiding specific operational practices to which firms' behavior must adhere. It is for these costs, therefore, that countervailing benefits must be provided. This relationship reinforces our emphasis on technological innovations that might reduce the costs of complying with such prescriptive requirements. Technological innovations that make it easier for firms to abide by performance standards may hold promise in encouraging more firms to support, and comply with, NSMD global certification systems.
A third feature critical to NSMD systems is the existence of verification procedures designed to ensure that any regulated entity that seeks reputational or material benefits from claiming compliance actually meets the stated standards. Verification is important because it provides the validation necessary for a certification program to achieve legitimacy, as certified products or services are then demanded and consumed along the market's supply chain. This distinguishes NSMD systems from many forms of corporate social responsibility initiatives that require limited or no outside monitoring.
29 Verification or auditing of compliance can be challenging and costly, involving field visits by experts, significant paperwork, and follow-up to ensure practices continue. This feature reinforces the need to assess the important role that new technologies might play in improving these processes and possibly reducing costs for smaller or marginalized producers that may otherwise not be able to participate due to the cost and logistical barriers verification procedures present. 30 A final critical feature is the focus on enabling and fostering the community of "demanders" through the market's supply chain. This can occur through boycotts and other direct action initiatives meant to convince large retailers to adopt purchasing policies favoring NSMD certification systems, and which then place pressure on suppliers to support such systems. Hence, the market's supply chain serves as the institutional arena in which evaluations over 27 See Büthe 2010b; Büthe and Mattli 2011. 28 Clapp 1998; Delmas 2002 . 29 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair 1998. 30 For discussion of these barriers see Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008; Mutersbaugh 2005 Mutersbaugh , 2008 Ponte 2008; and Starobin and Weinthal 2010. support occur and through which tracking systems are required to ensure that labeled products are produced by compliant firms. This tracking matters because consumer support for certified products requires the development of mechanisms to ensure consumers are actually purchasing products that are certified to, and in compliance with, the NSMD performance standards. The most dominant mechanism for accomplishing this occurs by tracing products from producer to end-consumer and even through the process of recycling and disposal. This tracking, in turn, delineates the "political community" 31 of environmental and social groups, firms, governments, and other stakeholders that attempt to promote, develop, and shape NSMD governance in a particular sector. Role of the market Support emanates from producers and consumers along the supply chain who evaluate the costs and benefits of joining Signals of support and compliance are fostered through "tracking" of certified products from producers to consumers and through disposal Adapted from Cashore 2002 , Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004 To be sure, the above classification system represents an ideal type; the precise fit of it will vary across time and sectors. Nonetheless, this effort does reveal how the class of NSMD global certification systems, with their focus on very specific on-the-ground behaviors, auditing for compliance, and tracking products through global supply chains, render them excellent cases for assessing the role of technological innovations in improving the operation and effectiveness of private regulation. Likewise, such a focus highlights a "chicken and egg" dilemma in which profit-seeking firms (the regulatory targets) require a market benefit before undertaking costly requirements of NSMD certification systems, while "demanders" expect to see guarantees of behavioral change before providing the market benefit, such as purchasing eco-labeled products.
32 Hence a 31 Bernstein and Cashore 2007 . 32 Bernstein . 6 Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010 ], Iss. 3, Art. 9 DOI: 10.2202 /1469 -3569.1323 focus on technology is useful because it may lessen this dilemma by both reducing the costs of compliance and by also making the label more credible, potentially helping to overcome the sequencing problem that prevents either supply or demand from forming. 33 Technologies that improve the mechanics of NSMD systems, such as making tracking more reliable, could potentially change evaluations of firms, stakeholders, and customers about whether and when to support NSMD certification systems, as well as better delineating and solidifying their global "political communities."
Analytical Framework
Given the complex ways technology can both exacerbate global environmental and social challenges and also nurture private regulation in general and NSMD certification systems in particular, what analytical distinctions are useful to inductively assess the relationships between technological innovations and private regulation? We identify three questions any comparative effort would need to assess.
First, analysts must ask what environmental and social challenges confront a given sector. Without an answer to this question it is impossible to know whether private regulation, in general, and a technological innovation, in particular, can ever address the problems of concern to the suppliers of private regulation. Attention to this question must therefore address the negative effects that technology has had in expanding global supply chains and creating incentives for the high extraction rates or other negative social and environmental practices that NSMD certification systems are attempting to reduce.
Second, it is critical to ask what forms of private regulation operate in a given sector. Analysts must identify the range of initiatives, taking care to identify how closely they fit the key features of NSMD certification systems noted above, and particularly whether regulations require behavioral changes to address social and environmental externalities, the policy content of the actual requirements, and whether formal assurances of compliance are required.
Third, it is necessary to ask whether and how technological innovations may improve the mechanics of private regulation and/or help to promote adherence to one or more of a program's performance standards. The former must include attention to the technologies that improve tracking of products, and also be open to other less obvious, but equally important impacts, such as the role of technology in rendering transparent any efforts to model future impacts, which may build trust in the claims made by the suppliers of private regulation. The 33 We are indebted to Tim Büthe for this insight about the sequencing problem as separate from the cost-benefit problem.
latter requires assessing technologies that either reduce the costs of complying with on-the-ground performance requirements or open up new possibilities for less intrusive behaviors. This requires attention to technologies that improve workers' health and safety or reduce "collateral" damage associated with particular practices. Likewise, analysts should take care to distinguish the social impact of technology, such as effects on equity or empowerment, workers' health, and safety concerns, from the impact of technology on a firm's environmental footprint. To be sure, some technologies will have simultaneous impacts on one or more of these concerns. For instance, the role of a cell phone or personal digital assistant (PDA) in communicating real-time commodity prices may enhance the bargaining power of producers previously hampered by information asymmetries while also facilitating better tracking of environmental behaviors. 
Application of the Analytical Framework
We apply the framework by first focusing on the problems confronting economic activities in the individual case study sectors and then reviewing the types of NSMD certification systems that have emerged to address these problems. We then turn to assessing the role of technology in improving both the mechanics of NSMD systems and compliance with their performance standards. To generate cross-sectoral comparisons, we do not present the five cases individually, but instead integrate the cases within an overall assessment of the three questions identified in our analytical framework.
The Problems Confronting the Case Study Sectors
The environmental and social challenges in the case study sectors, which involve the extraction and/or management of natural resources, are extensive, as established by a wealth of scientific evidence. Research underscores the widespread and alarming pace of global forest deterioration through the shifts in ecosystem structure and function and biodiversity loss, much of which is fueled by poor forestry practices and deforestation-resulting in what some refer to as the sixth major mass extinction in the Earth's history. 35 In Africa and Latin America alone one hundred million hectares of tropical forests were lost between 1990 and 2000. 36 Conservation biologists studying protected areas have found 34 Daviron and Ponte 2005. 35 Leakey and Lewin 1995; Pimm and Brooks 2000. 36 UNEP 2002. that the existing efforts to preserve twelve percent of the world's forests from industrial extraction will not be sufficient to check the decline in biodiversity.
37
Turning to the oceans, global fisheries declines are arguably one of the greatest challenges of our time. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations estimates that, of the stocks with sufficient assessment data, seventy-five percent are "fully exploited or overexploited (or depleted and recovering from depletion)." 38 The direct causes include increased consumption, and, ironically, fish farming which reduces human consumption pressure on wild stocks but also creates an array of risks to ocean fisheries. These include increased disease and pathogen infections for wild stocks and demands on previously noncommercial species for aquaculture feed. 39 Fishing for a target species frequently ensnares significant quantities of non-target species, a phenomenon known as "bycatch."
40 Habitats destroyed or degraded by bottom trawling and dredging further exacerbate the ecosystem-wide effects of heavy fishing efforts.
The live-reef-fish trade is a smaller scale example of the challenges facing marine ecosystems. Beginning in the 1950s the ornamental fish industry, which supplies home aquariums, has grown into a profitable market for small fishing villages in Southeast Asia. 41 Negative impacts include depletion of fish species and degradation of coral reefs particularly when cyanide and dynamite are used to stun fish and break apart the coral. Although these techniques make harvesting easier, they also degrade the coral thereby reducing its quality as habitat, and weaken the fish, leaving them less hardy for transportation to markets.
42
Coffee production also creates a number of environmental and social challenges. Social impacts include social-justice issues associated with global supply chains that tend to reinforce and reproduce a system where wealthy consumers benefit from, and contribute to, community impoverishment in developing countries. This, in turn, undermines health and education services, further limiting development options. Similar concerns arise with labor practices in the cultivation, processing and transport of coffee. Environmental challenges include deforestation through clearing for coffee, and land degradation and water pollution associated with the use of chemicals and fertilizers and dumping of organic waste. 43 37 Sinclair et al 1995. 38 Food and Agricultural Organization 2007. 39 Naylor and Burke 2005; Naylor et al 2000. 40 Chuenpagdee et al 2003. 41 Baquero 1999; Barber and Pratt 1997; Rubec et al 2001; Shuman, Hodgson, and Ambrose 2004. 42 In the case of cyanide, fishers dive the reef, searching for marketable reef fish. The fishers then squirt the poison in the water to stun fish so that they can be easily caught in nets. If needed, the fishers further degrade the reef by breaking apart coral to reach hiding fish. Cervino et al 2003; Rubec et al 2001. 43 Rice and McLean 1999; Luttinger and Dicum 2006. Our final two cases, electronic waste (e-waste) and climate change, have similar degrading effects on ecosystems but create pollution externalities, either as emissions from manufacturing, transport and power generation or as waste. Ewaste, such as post-consumer computers and mobile phones, is estimated to be the fastest growing component of our waste stream 44 owing to the enormous amount of electronic equipment that is sold each year, 45 only a tiny fraction of which is recycled. 46 International environmental groups purport that large amounts of these products are not recycled domestically but are sent to countries of the global South, such as China, India, Nigeria, and Ghana. 47 While some of these electronic devices are refurbished for reuse, a large amount cannot be reused and are instead striped of valuable materials in ways that harm human health and create local toxic waste problems. Even when recycled in advanced countries, workers' health and safety issues, as well as pollution issues resulting from incineration or disposal in landfills, are important concerns.
Finally, the release of greenhouse gases is, by almost all accounts, the most pressing challenge facing the planet. Arguably no problem has received greater scientific and scholarly attention in recent years. This is an immense problem owing to both its potential impacts, with scientists forecasting that we risk "mass extinctions" if average temperatures rise by more than 1.5-2.5 degrees Celsius. 48 Many political processes have led to various agreements to limit warming to 2° C above pre-industrial levels, with some scientists calling for limiting warming to 1.5° C. 49 Temperature has already risen 0.8° C in the last century (roughly 0.6° C thereof in the last three decades), and we are committed to an additional 0.6° C because of thermal inertia. 50 Limiting atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to 450 ppm-which still implies a probability of twenty-six to seventy-eight percent of overshooting the 2° C goal 51 -would require developed nations to reduce emissions by eighty to ninety-five percent compared to 1990 levels, with substantial deviation from business-as-usual 44 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that in 2005 2.63 million tons of ewaste was added to the municipal waste stream in the U.S. and another 3.01 million tons in 2007. 45 In 2007, 269 million, and in 2008, 295 million computers (desktops and laptops) were sold worldwide. IDC 2008 IDC , 2009a . This is based on the number of total shipments, i.e. manufacturers' sales to stores. For mobile phone sales, the numbers are a staggering 1.14 billion units in 
The NSMD Programs Formed to Address the Problems
In response to the accelerating nature of the environmental challenges, and frustrations with the efforts of governments and intergovernmental negotiations to address them, unlikely coalitions of environmental groups, social activists and proactive business associations have emerged to create, and support, a range of NSMD certification systems (see Table 2 ). Within forestry, the FSC, one of the first globally oriented NSMD systems, was formed in 1993 following frustration with the limited impact of the intergovernmental International Tropical Timber Agreement;
53 failed efforts to sign a global forest convention at the 1992 Rio Summit (UNCED); 54 and tropical timber boycott campaigns led by the Rainforest Action Network, among others. The FSC coalesced and expanded a variety of eco-labeling/certification efforts including, the Rainforest Alliance's SmartWood Program formed in 1989 to certify timber from well-managed forests, Friends of the Earth-UK's "Good Wood" scheme formed in 1987, 55 and initiatives such as Hubert Kwisthout's Ecological Trading Company that incorporated to source sustainable timber directly. 56 The FSC sparked a spate of producer-backed programs, many of which are now housed under the umbrella of the Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC).
Within fisheries, separate programs exist for ocean-capture and aquaculture. The first certification programs focused on "organic" aquaculture aimed to promote practices limiting the negative effects of aquaculture on marine environments. The Soil Association first worked on salmon and trout farming in 1989, which led to an interim standard in 1998. During this same time Bio-GRO and Naturland developed their own organic standards. refurbishers and government representatives. 74 We suspect that, as with the PEFC in the forestry case, the R2 program will evolve to contain more prescriptive performance requirements. An important facet of the R2 standard, which makes it distinct from e-Stewards, is that it permits exports of certain hazardous e-waste especially to developing countries. 75 The current NSMD certification systems for climate issues comprise numerous organizations that verify and certify the credits associated with carbon offset projects. The standards differ in their specific rules and methodologies, including their stringency, inclusion of requirements regarding non-carbon issues such as biodiversity protection or sustainable development, and project eligibility. A staggeringly complicated set of seventeen standards currently operate. In an effort to combine these standards and to reduce confusion, the Climate Group, the International Emissions Trading Association, and the World Economic Forum created the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) in 2007. Though not an early arrival to the offset market, the VCS achieved a leading position-in 2009 certifying thirty-five percent of the voluntary market-in part because it serves to standardize the market but also because it reduces organizational barriers by linking multiple credit registries. 76 If VCS represents the baseline, then the Gold Standard certification, created and supported by non-profit organizations with leadership by WWF, SouthSouthNorth, and Helio International, aims to be the "quality benchmark" for offset projects. It will only certify renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency projects that actively promote sustainable development.
Improving the Regulatory Mechanics of NSMD Systems
We distinguish in this section those technologies that hold promise for reducing the costs of tracking goods through supply chains from those that provide other means, such as greater transparency and/or knowledge generation, with which to provide assurances that the labeled product is achieving the objectives the customer is paying for. Both of these processes are important, as we noted above, for improving the efficient operation of the regulatory mechanics of NSMD certification systems. Specifically, we discuss tracking and auditing technologies, followed by technologies facilitating accounting, an issue particularly relevant for climate-mitigation programs. 74 The R2 standard is not operated by the EPA itself. ISRI has included the standard in its certification program and now offers RIOS/R2 certification. Contrary to the e-Stewards standard, the R2 standard is not a global standard, but limited to the U.S. See Renckens 2010. 75 The e-Stewards program follows a Basel Convention amendment that bans such exports, a provision that does not yet have support from the necessary number of parties to be adopted as a formal amendment. Important to note is that the U.S. has not ratified the Convention yet. 76 Hamilton et al 2010.
Tracking and Auditing: A review of literature on the role of tracking and auditing technology reveals the important role of four related innovations: geographic information systems (GIS), global positioning systems (GPS), cellular phones or PDAs, and DNA and chemical testing. 77 First, GIS and GPS technologies facilitate spatial mapping of production and trade activities as they are conducted over time. GIS maps (such as Google maps) provide an initial broad assessment of land-use for the regulation of forest management, agricultural, or other practices, and a tool for the identification of ewaste recycling and disposal sites that would otherwise go undetected. For example, such GIS technology can help auditors assess whether firms are operating in protected areas and other areas of concern. GPS devices, on the other hand, allow for tracking of individual pieces of machinery or products, offering a low cost way to track, with a computer chip, pretty much anything. This has great potential for tracking products along supply chains but can also be used to monitor the movement of machinery within forest cut-blocks or fishing vessels out at sea.
Second, cellular phones and PDAs greatly improve the efficiency of collecting and disseminating information.
78 They can reduce the cost of uploading information and allow this information to be immediately available across a wireless network. For our purposes what is important is that these devices can interact with advancements in GPS and GIS technologies to provide virtually immediate tracking. That is, without a cell phone or PDA, GPS data must be uploaded manually whenever the operator or auditor is physically at the central server. However, these mobile devices make data transfer immediate-reducing uploading problems-and greatly facilitate "real time" tracking, which is often critical for stopping mistakes and/or providing immediate information facilitating the efficient flow of products along supply chains.
Finally, technologies such as DNA testing and chemical analysis can pin point a product's species, the geographic provenance of a product, and/or whether the product has been produced using an environmentally damaging practice. In this respect, these technologies correct information asymmetries in the market, offering clear and credible assurances about the qualities of the product.
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The technologies discussed above have been developed quite recently and their use in NSMD systems has barely begun. Yet there are already a few notable examples of such uses, which illustrate how these tracking technologies have 77 Bird and Thiel 2007; Chandra 2005; Degen 2007 Degen , 2008 Fuller 2006; Gautam 2006a; 2006b; Hagendijk and Irwin 2006; Hague and Loader 1999; Nielsen and Kjaer 2008; Pickles 1997; Resosudarmo and Subiman 2006; Ridder 2007; Bartley 2010. 78 Ironically, the rapid development of this technology has also led to the "dumping" challenges that e-waste certification is now attempting to ameliorate. 79 Akerlof 1970 . 16 Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010 ], Iss. 3, Art. 9 DOI: 10.2202 /1469 -3569.1323 worked alone or in concert to facilitate the mechanics of NSMD certification systems in our case studies. The first example comes from the ornamental fish trade. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Academy for Educational Development initiated a pilot project termed "Tracking Nemo," 80 which promotes "an integrated, real-time, web-based information technology (IT) system to enhance identity preservation and traceability capacity within the Philippines' marine aquarium trade." 81 The project relays real-time data to help coordinate the supply and demand sides of the market with the aim of: directing fishers to collect only the fish needed; avoiding over-harvesting; improving income distribution by tracking shipment results and payment details; and tracking the sustainable product throughout the chain of custody to facilitate certification efforts. It also sought to reduce the burden of certification's paperwork requirements by giving the local fish traders PDAs that would wirelessly link into the buyer's order, a photo database of marine ornamental species, and a receipt form. 82 In a country that averages six daily mobile-phonebased text messages per capita, 83 this PDA technology builds on a cultural norm of using mobile devices-a norm that cuts across professions and includes more socioeconomic strata than reading manuals or filling out paper forms would. It also reduces the literacy requirement of reporting, since forms can be photobased. While further refinements are needed for the technology to be operational throughout the trade, this project provides a useful illustration of how improving tracking mechanics can also concurrently improve the sustainability of the trade and the resource, as we discuss further below.
Second, DNA testing and chemical tests, such as stable isotope analysis, have great potential to improve tracking of natural resource commodities and agricultural crops. Research is currently advancing methods for using DNA tests to determine the geographic origin of a tree species. If, as expected, the cost of conducting such tests is reduced over time, this innovation could provide a transformative breakthrough for tracking a number of seafood, timber and agricultural products through global supply chains. It could, at its highest potency, eliminate the cumbersome process of physically tracking products, allowing instead verification of origins once a product reached its final market. More modestly, it could act as a "quality assurance" to assess, and distinguish, tracking of certified products from "fake certificates" common in Indonesia and China. 83 Gordon 2005. 84 Such false claims are rampant in developed countries as well. One study using DNA technology found that eighty percent of restaurants in New York State were making false claims that their salmon was "wild" when in fact, they were farmed. Brown 2009; Nielsen and Kjaer 2008; Technologia 2009; Azevedo 2008; Helveta 2009. Although DNA testing is expensive, especially when attempting to identify an individual species of narrow place of origin rather than a general region, academic and commercial research is progressively reducing these costs. 85 While some remain skeptical of just what this technology can achieve, DNA testing has already been used to expose restaurants that falsely label seafood, giving a lesser species the name of a higher valued one so as to increase sales or justify higher prices and profits. The MSC now also reports that it uses DNA tests to spot check labeled products to confirm their species and origins, an added layer of oversight to bolster its credibility.
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Chemical analysis has also been useful in the ornamental fish trade, where a number of laboratories in the Philippines can check samples of live fish for cyanide residues. This test is meant to determine whether or not the fish was caught using cyanide, and its deployment may therefore serve as a deterrent for fishers thinking of using this substance. However, the test requires killing the fish, its accuracy has been questioned on scientific grounds, and it remains costly, indicating that it may have only limited potential. 87 Still, it illustrates how ex post tests on products can be used to offer assurances of the claims made by NSMD certification systems.
Finally, although DNA tests are not applicable to e-waste, there are interesting tracking efforts emerging that draw on the other technologies discussed above. GIS technologies have helped identify sites in developing countries where illegal e-waste activities are occurring and GPS receivers can be used to track the movements of disposed electronic devices or containers of these waste streams, as has already been done by NGOs such as Greenpeace to bring illegal trade to the public's attention. 88 The Indian government has also begun using GPS to track containers of e-waste domestically to ensure they are properly disposed. 89 On a more pessimistic note, since discarded electronics are not necessarily traded in one piece, affixing the needed tracking chip may prove more difficult and certainly more costly. This situation may quickly change, however, as recent research has used the quantity of tin and lead in jewelry exported from China to assess whether the source materials for these products are likely recycled metals from electronic devices, finding evidence that this is likely the case. 90 On balance current uses and applications seem to indicate that some of these tracking technologies hold less potential for reducing the costs of tracking for e-waste than possible for fisheries, forestry, agricultural and the aquarium trade. 
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Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010 ], Iss. 3, Art. 9 DOI: 10.2202 /1469 -3569.1323 Accounting: With some sectors, NSMD certification systems need to track gases, such as greenhouse gas emissions. Instead of tracking specific units, therefore, these programs focus on accounting for net gains and losses in an overall budget, a regulatory problem distinct from the physical tracking described for the case of fisheries, forestry, agriculture and even e-waste. For this kind of regulatory accounting problem, other types of technological innovations have proven useful. For instance, internet-based registries help with the issuance, transfer, tracking, retirement, and reporting of offset credits. They also provide assurances that credits are not "double counted," which happens when the same avoided emissions are granted credits using two different standards associations. The APX Registry, which supports the VCS, addresses this issue by checking the latitude and longitude of newly submitted projects against those of other projects. If the project is in close proximity to an already registered project, this information is provided to the verifying organization for further investigation. As markets for environmental services grow, whether in the regulatory or non-state realms, technological infrastructure to support the transactions will become even more important to assure environmental effectiveness.
Devising acceptable methodologies for certifying carbon offset credits from the forestry sector has proven difficult. Particular issues for forestry projects relate to greater risk for leakage (displaced land-use activities shifting to an area outside the project boundaries), as well as concerns about permanence (the trees could die or catch fire, emitting the stored carbon) and additionality (ensuring the offsets go beyond reductions that would happen under business-as-usual). A technological innovation that has emerged in the voluntary market-applied by a number of the standards-is the use of carbon modeling. The purpose of the modeling is to accurately depict the dynamics of land-use change in the area and the effect of the offset project on those dynamics. In this way, the model can quantify the expected leakage, and discount the carbon credits accordingly. This can help to assuage buyers concerned about the accuracy and credibility of forestry offset credits.
Improving Compliance with NSMD Performance Standards
A wider range of technological innovations have potential to make it easier to meet performance standards. Some technologies, such as devices that have been developed to exclude turtles from shrimp trawling nets and high floatation tires that reduce soil compaction in the context of tree harvesting, make it possible to conduct commercial operations while minimizing externalities. Other technologies facilitate new production processes and/or lead to the development of products that reduce emissions or waste. Technologies can also be used to remove toxins once emitted, or to reduce human exposure. To date however, their implementation appears to result in additional, not reduced, costs to firms.
Still, in a number of cases, we find evidence that the fit between the requirements of a certification program and local context matters for how likely it is that methods will be found for reducing compliance costs. Technological innovations may serve as intervening variables, allowing an easier reconciliation between the two sets of expectations-those of the local community and those of the certification institution.
We found the strongest illustration of this relationship in the ornamental fish trade. The ornamental fish industry is unique compared to most other NSMD certification systems in that the product subject to private regulations must be caught and delivered to the consumer alive.
91 Yet the diffuse nature of the product's supply chain meant that in the absence of certification, the benefits of maintaining a healthy catch were not well matched with benefits for those handling the fish. Hence, fishers would employ destructive capture methods whose negative impacts on the fish would not be apparent until after they were sold to purchasers in the next step in the chain of custody. In addition to harming the fish, the destructive capture methods also harmed the marine environment in which the fish lived. As a result, the "Tracking Nemo" project utilized PDAs to ameliorate both these issues by better matching supply with demand. Best management practices were also introduced to improve performance. Training began in the 1980s, introducing net-barrier methods and low-cost handling techniques such as perforated buckets or cages immersed in the water, which reduced mortality rates and enhanced product quality.
92 With lower mortality rates, fishers could catch less fish and have the same amount arrive to fulfill orders alive. Still, even these techniques can be expensive for poor fishing communities and, with currently limited attention to customer demand, often do not enhance profitability. 
Discussion: Emerging Themes in Technology's Role in Private Regulation
In assessing the potential of technology both for improving the efficiency of tracking, and for easing-or increasing the level of-compliance with on-theground performance requirements of NSMD certification systems, our analysis revealed two additional insights that were "beyond our model" but important for understanding how technological innovations influence private regulation. 94 First, 91 Auld et al 2009. 92 Rubec et al 2001. 93 With the training, costs were reduced through the use of donated barrier nets. 94 Büthe 2002.
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Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010 ], Iss. 3, Art. 9 DOI: 10.2202 /1469 -3569.1323 technologies shape how problems are understood and whether coalitions can form in support of problem-oriented private regulatory institutions. Second, the ability of NSMD systems to foster learning means these programs can serve as incubators for technologies that may in turn improve the operation of government regulations.
Technology Shaping Problem Definitions and Winning Coalitions
Problem Definition: Technological innovations shape how we think about global problems, either by influencing what solutions appear feasible and possible, or by uncovering previously misunderstood or neglected facets of ecological and social systems, such as the novel-for-the-time measurements that revealed thinning of the ozone layer over the North and South poles. In the forest sector, for instance, the emergence and application of technology that improves traceability has coincided with efforts to promote timber legality verification. While important, timber legality has much more modest goals than the objective of sustainable and environmental forest management associated with the FSC. This may be in part owing to what timber tracking technology can and cannot accomplish: it can identify the origin of wood, but it cannot determine how it was harvested. If technology shapes the art of "what is possible" to be certified using NSMD mechanisms, then it is important to reflect on what this means for how problems are defined. Such questions, to be sure, are not easy. For instance, it may be, as Cashore et al have theorized, 95 that more modest goals for NSMD systems in the short term may help nurture and develop supply chain tracking systems, which would then permit more stringent standards or more ambitious environmental or social objectives at a later time-an insight which we turn to below in discussing the formation of winning coalitions supportive of private regulations.
Technologies also appear to shape our understanding of problems through the way they influence the organization of, and production within, global supply chains. This goes beyond their role in creating problems, as we discussed at the outset, and instead underscores that technology shapes the feasibility of different policy solutions, which indirectly can influence the ways problems are understood and defined. For instance, technology is important for understanding the current state of the coffee industry, which has permitted small coffee-growing communities to play a role despite the prevalence of major industrial corporations. Though coffee traders and coffee roasters are highly concentrated, with a small number of firms controlling a large proportion of the world market, 96 two factors work to ensure that a requirement for capital does not pose an insurmountable 95 Cashore et al 2007. 96 Ponte 2004; Gresser and Tickell 2002; Daviron and Ponte 2005. barrier to entry. First, coffee stored in the right conditions can be kept in its green form for long periods of time without seriously degrading, particularly in comparison to perishable crops. 97 Second, the cost of a small commercial roasting machine is minimal relative to capital needed in many other industries (for instance, the paper industry) and there are fewer economies of scale in roasting.
98
Taken together, these two characteristics of the coffee industry mean it may be hard for the larger roasters and traders in the industry to prevent entry by socially minded companies and organizations that seek to offer an alternative vision for how trade should occur. 99 This effect does not, however, apply across all agricultural crops and hence illustrates how the feasibility of solutions-in this case setting up trade channels separate from those controlled by major companies-influences whether or not engagement with major firms is considered a problem or an acceptable part of the solution. Indeed, in other sectors, such as bananas, Shreck explains that highly perishable crops requiring sometimes capital-intensive care throughout their production, transport, and distribution will pose challenges for those aiming to set up a parallel trading system. This characteristic of the banana industry forces engagement with major firms.
100
Winning Coalitions: The same technological innovations that direct problem definitions towards a narrower focus on issues such as legality verification in the short term may nevertheless foster the emergence of winning coalitions favoring enforcement of environmental and social standards in the future. 101 This pattern is most evident in the forest sector. 102 Because illegal timber deflates global timber market prices, by up to fifteen percent according to some estimates, a focus on verifying timber tracking, if relatively straightforward, would draw strategic support from legal forest operators, environmental groups and governments. All of these stakeholders would see their material interests advanced by such efforts: Industry would receive higher prices; government would gain increased timber revenue from legal operations; and environmental groups would eliminate a contributing factor to deforestation and forest degradation. Legality verification differs from the verification of broader sustainable forest management standards because it is easier to "weed out" the worst products from markets than reward the top products (and through them the desirable behavior), since excluding the worst need not rely on consumers' 97 
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Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010 ], Iss. 3, Art. 9 DOI: 10.2202 /1469 -3569.1323 willingness to demand ethical or environmental products. For example, demand for legally verified forest products has come from the U.S. government, through amendments to the Lacey Act, which now requires that firms show "due care" in ensuring they do not purchase or sell illegal products. The EU Parliament recently passed similar legislation, under which due care can be met by directly importing from tropical and other countries who sign "voluntary partnership agreements" (VPAs) with the EU. Otherwise importers must turn to some type of assurance, such as private legality verification, to demonstrate compliance. In these cases, government legislation creates the demand for private regulation because importers fear breaking the law-a much more durable and effective incentive than relying on customer's moral concerns over degradation. 103 What is important for our review, and yet understudied in the literature, is the clear role of technological breakthroughs in fostering attention toward legality and the subsequent unleashing of a global coalition it has created.
Although the links are not as well articulated in the context of fisheries or e-waste certification, the possibilities are there for a similar dynamic to emerge. Indeed, the Lacey Act has been used to fight illegal fishing activities since a 1981 amendment, offering nearly 20 years of experiences before the Act was extended to forestry. 104 As expected, the issue of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has spurred some industry players to help facilitate regulatory action. Erceg discusses two groups, the International Southern Ocean Longline Fisheries Information Clearing House and the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators, both of which have produced reports seeking to fetter out IUU operators.
105
Similar patterns might also occur with e-waste. Most of the recycling in developing countries is done in the informal sector, in individually or small family-owned informal businesses. 106 All types of hazardous processes are used in these situations, with severe human health and environmental risks involved.
107
Modern tracking systems such as bar code or GPS tracking, as well as innovations in worker health and safety equipment, could boost support from formal recycling businesses in those countries for increased public or private regulation. These formal recyclers, which are slowly emerging, are competing on price with the informal businesses that do not comply with legal requirements or private standards on legality verification, or environmentally and socially sound recycling behavior. The potential of technology to improve efforts to weed out illegal 103 As Cafaggi and Janczuk (2010) show, this is a common practice in the EU. 104 activities and to improve social conditions may therefore foster, and reinforce, politically powerful "Bootlegger and Baptist" coalitions in favor of expanding, not reducing, attention to global problems.
NSMD Certification Systems as Incubator for Technological Innovations
The climate case illustrates how NSMD systems may create arenas for innovations that will also facilitate government regulation. This means that, notwithstanding Meyer and Gereffi's warning about the limits of private regulation as a substitute for government regulations, 108 private authority may play a role as technology incubator, potentially facilitating and fostering, rather than bypassing, traditional public policy efforts at the domestic or global levels.
109
Operation of the climate NSMD certification system involves investment by participants, leading to positive feedback effects, and the potential for greater contributions to problem amelioration. Offset project developers design projects to comply with individual standards, creating specific investments that give them an interest in the maintenance of a carbon market. Further, the market functions as a "testing ground for procedures, methodologies and technologies."
110 This appears to produce two kinds of learning effects. First, potential buyers of carbon credits and the public more generally can learn and gain confidence in how carbon markets function by participating in the evolution of this voluntary form. In countries without climate change legislation, like the United States, positive learning effects achieved through the NSMD certification system could reduce barriers to support for policy change. Second, producers of the carbon offsets achieve efficiency gains through experience in how to generate the credits (i.e., the application of the technology). Transferred into the context of regulated entities, the dividends from these advances could significantly multiply. For example, one standards association advertises: "Voluntary offset projects can deliver economic efficiency (best use of investment) and environmental benefits (lower emitting technologies are developed and implemented)... Abatements found in the voluntary market can then serve to assist in technology developments in the compliance market."
111
Why might greater innovation be occurring within the voluntary offset market than within compliance markets? Generally, it appears that the voluntary market has a more flexible organizational structure and involves lower costs compared to compliance markets, particularly the project-based Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the United Nation's Kyoto Protocol. In fact, "procedural inefficiencies and regulatory bottlenecks" have led to delays in the approval of CDM projects, which in turn has "dampen[ed] enthusiasm for further innovation."
112 If indeed the voluntary carbon market has an influence on the direction of the regulatory markets, then these choices of winners and losers among technologies and project types could be magnified in the larger market over time.
Conclusions: Reflections and Future Research
The role of technology in facilitating and fostering economic globalization on a vast scale, encouraging consumption and widening our ecological footprint, is well documented, including in every one of the sectors under review. What are less studied, however, are the countervailing effects technology might have in nurturing efforts to reverse the negative effects of neoliberal globalization by embedding social and environmental norms within market transactions. Our paper has begun to fill this gap by addressing the role of technology in two very different ways: how it might better link "demanders" to "targets" through innovative tracking technology; and how it might allow "targets" to more efficiently improve their environmental performance.
Several important conclusions arise from our inductive efforts. First, we have explored the individual and collective potential of technologies that enhance the spatial and real time mapping of human activities, such as GPS and GIS, and those that can determine product origins and production methods ex post, particularly DNA testing and various chemical analyses. In all the cases reviewed, there are intriguing examples of how these technological innovations are enhancing the potential of NSMD certification systems to track products along complex global supply chains and offer assurances to stakeholders and consumers about the methods used to produce goods. NSMD systems regulating natural resource and agricultural commodities appear, at this point, to have more technological advancements to draw on than e-waste, though such cross-sectoral conclusions require further analysis.
Second, a focus on technology as both a possible cause of, and solution to, environmental problems, misses an important but less obvious impact: their role in helping foster new global communities oriented around ameliorating environmental and social problems. Our inductive effort allowed us to uncover this much more complex, less direct, but potentially crucial impact. While technologies can sometimes facilitate compliance with NSMD performance requirements, our analysis suggests that these gains are, alone, unlikely to overcome the environmental problems associated with economic globalization. Yet tracking technologies that unite NSMD global communities-as lines on a map do for states-direct us to pay careful attention to the structural features of different forms of private regulation, rather than simply focusing on their standards or initial ability to garner support. A focus on the technologies improving tracking reshapes calculations of why different actors might support or join such systems, casting a new perspective on the ultimate potential of private authority. Tracking technologies provide new opportunities to solidify and link global political communities, even while they better translate existing demands. And both of these immediate impacts could be most important as prerequisites for enabling larger scale transformations at a later time.
Recognition of this potential requires much greater attention to the ways in which private regulations evolve, and how they interact with other forms of private and public governance, and may yield important strategic implications about the role of technology in nurturing these efforts. For instance, a focus on tracking to unite global communities may require avoiding, initially at least, wider prescriptive standards, as these may deter uptake on the part of targeted firms. Instead, it may be necessary to first advance modest standards so that initial coalitions of support can focus on building tracking mechanisms, rather than supporting dueling certification programs that serve to create confusion in the market place and limit the tracking project. In the forest sector, for example, this may mean that, if private authority is to be nurtured, strategists will need to focus on the important, but more limited question of legality verification because the coalition of supporters and firms likely to benefit would be broader but could only form if tracking is undertaken. This in turn forces us to recognize the important role that government can play in creating rules governing imports of forest products, which may then, in turn, create incentives for firms to support nongovernmental and transnational monitoring and certification of legal forest products as a way of meeting domestic legal requirements.
To be sure, the interaction of modest standards with technological developments to support supply chain tracking would have to constitute the beginning, not the end of the evolution of NSMD certification systems, since modest standards would be unable to address environmental and social challenges that carry high costs. Could such effort create the prerequisites for such an evolution? It seems plausible. Once products are tracked along a supply chain and all legal producers are demanding tracked inputs, it will be much easier to increase standards in ways that reward, rather than punish, participants who minimize negative externalities. And here, technology may indeed provide the missing piece of the puzzle by providing both the means for, and reducing the cost of, what is required to track products in ways that provide credible assurances. Whether and how technology might work to link global communities to overcome the "chicken and egg" dilemma facing NSMD certifications systems will be highly dependent on the specific attributes of each sector. We cannot assume that what is possible and necessary in the forest sector will be the same for the ornamental fish trade or fair trade coffee-both of which are much more specialized and may, with adequate market demand, address the specific set of problems they target. 113 Finally, while we have focused on the way in which NSMD certification systems can serve as incubators for innovation, it is important to recognize that this is a critical area where private regulation intersects with public authority. The state remains a crucial supporter of innovation, both through the provisions of intellectual property rights, but also via more direct and targeted investments in innovation. Hence, although we have stressed the way technology may positively shape the mechanics of and compliance with private regulation, future research should take care to consider how states feature in this process. Just as there is considerable discussion within inter-governmental processes on the need for technology transfer to developing countries, our review highlights the importance in understanding how such technological diffusion might occur between states and private regulation.
What is clear is that technological innovations have important, and yet complex, impacts in shaping new identities, problem definitions and global coalitions, and in fostering new solutions. Our review has demonstrated the importance of continuing to study the precise nature of these relationships if we are to advance both the scholarship and practice of private regulation in the global economy.
